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Abstract
This study compared estimations of the probability and cost of negative events occurring made by patients with post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD) (n = 43), patients with other anxiety disorders (n = 29) and non-patients’ (n = 35). Prior to treatment PTSD
patients overestimated the probability and cost of all types of traumatic events occurring relative to non-patients, and overestimated
the probability and cost of the specific type of traumatic event that they had been traumatized by relative to the anxious controls as
well as non-patients. These judgment biases were specific to traumatic events and did not generalise to all negative events. PTSD
patients’ estimations of the probability and cost of traumatic events were significantly reduced following treatment, and were no
longer significantly different from those of non-patients. Results suggest that patients with PTSD show specific judgment biases in
the estimation of probability and cost, which can be successfully modified by cognitive therapy.
# 2008 Elsevier Ltd.
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Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a common
and disabling anxiety disorder (Yehuda, 2001). In recent
years several cognitive models of PTSD have been
proposed (see Brewin & Holmes, 2003, for a review).
Some of these cognitive models of PTSD are based on
the generic cognitive model of anxiety (Beck, 1976) that
posits that anxiety results from the appraisal of future* Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 1 865 223986;
fax: +44 1 865 226411.
E-mail address: freda.mcmanus@obmh.nhs.uk (F. McManus).
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Open access under CC BY license. threat. However, in the case of PTSD the trauma has
already happened and thus the threat is no longer
impending. Ehlers and Clark’s cognitive model of
PTSD (2000) attempts to account for this anomaly by
proposing that individuals who experience persistent
PTSD interpret the trauma or its sequelae in maladap-
tive ways that give rise to a sense of current threat.
These idiosyncratic interpretations may relate to the
external world (e.g., ‘‘I will be assaulted again’’), to
themselves (e.g., ‘‘this event/my reactions to it show
that I am inferior to others’’), to the future (e.g., ‘‘I will
never be able to lead a normal life or be happy again’’)
or to the meaning of their symptoms (e.g., ‘‘these
symptoms show what a weak person I am’’).
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Beck (1976) proposed that perceived danger or threat
is substantially determined by the joint product of the
subjective probability and cost of a feared event. Studies
have shown that increased estimates of the probability
and cost of certain types of negative events are present in
generalized anxiety disorder (Butler & Mathews, 1983),
social phobia (Foa, Franklin, Perry, & Herbert, 1996;
McManus, Clark, & Hackmann, 2000), and agoraphobia
(McNally & Roa, 1987). Some of these studies have
reported content-specificity of these judgment biases. For
example, people with social phobia overestimated the
probability and cost of future negative social events
occurring, but not negative non-social events (Foa et al.,
1996). However, Smith and Bryant (2000) reported that
traumatized adults with acute stress disorder (ASD)
overestimated the probability and cost not only of
dangerous external events, but also of negative social
events and negative somatic events. They concluded that
because the experience of trauma leads to the develop-
ment of wide reaching and dysfunctional fear networks,
the traumatized individual’s sense of threat extends far
beyond the context of the original trauma.
The only study that has looked at estimations of
probability and cost in PTSD was carried out with
children. It found that children with PTSD did not
overestimate the probability of future negative events
occurring, such as being bullied at school, in
comparison to controls (Dalgleish et al., 2000).
Although this is in contrast to Smith and Bryant’s
(2000) report of overestimations of probability and cost
in ASD, it is consistent with other studies where
children failed to show the biases in probability and cost
reported in adult samples (Dalgleish et al., 1997).
A further line of research has investigated effects of
treatment on biases in estimations of probability and
cost. This research suggests that such biases in social
phobia can be attenuated by cognitive therapy (Lucock
& Salkovskis, 1988) though not necessarily to the level
shown by non-patients (e.g., McManus et al., 2000). It is
not clear whether reductions in the overestimation of
probability or cost are most closely related to
improvement in treatment, with some studies reporting
reductions in cost of negative events being most closely
associated with treatment outcome (e.g., Foa et al.,
1996) and others finding that reductions in the
overestimation of probability are more closely linked
to improvement in treatment (McManus et al., 2000). It
is not know whether treatment outcome in PTSD is
associated with corresponding changes in the estima-
tions of probability or cost of negative events.The current study has two key aims: first, to
investigate whether adults with PTSD overestimate
the probability and cost of being involved in future
traumatic and/or negative non-traumatic events, relative
to patients with other anxiety disorders and non-
patients, and second to examine the extent to which
these judgment biases are modified by cognitive therapy
and whether changes in estimation of probability or cost
are associated with improvement in treatment.
2. Method
2.1. Participants
Three groups of participants took part in the study:
patients with PTSD, an anxious control group compris-
ing patients suffering anxiety disorders other than
PTSD, and non-patient controls. All participants were
aged between 18 and 65 years. Patients were recruited
from the Centre for Anxiety Disorders and Trauma,
Maudsley Hospital, London, UK, an outpatient specia-
list National Health Service clinic that receives referrals
from family doctors and community mental health
clinics. Inclusion criteria for the clinic are that the
patient’s main problem is an anxiety disorder. Patients
were diagnosed with the Structured Clinical Interview
for DSM-IV (First et al., 1995) and met DSM-IV
diagnostic criteria. Exclusion criteria for the present
study were that the patient suffered from one of the
following disorders to such a degree that it required
immediate treatment in its own right: psychosis or
bipolar disorder, alcohol or drug dependence, severe
depressive disorder (i.e., immediate suicide risk) or
borderline personality disorder. For the PTSD group,
additional exclusion criteria were (i) severe ongoing
threat (i.e., that the person continued to be in
unacceptable level of personal danger as a consequence
of the trauma), and (ii) an inability to remember the
traumatic event. Patients with multiple traumatic events
and those that had failed to respond to previous
treatments were included. The types of traumatic event
experienced by the PTSD group included serious traffic
accidents, torture, sexual and non-sexual assaults.
The PTSD group consisted of 43 participants (15
men) about to start a course of cognitive therapy for
PTSD (Ehlers et al., 2003; Ehlers, Clark, Hackmann,
McManus, & Fennell, 2005). Of the 43 participants who
took part in the pre-treatment phase, 36 agreed to repeat
the questionnaires post-treatment. Of the seven parti-
cipants who did not repeat the questionnaires, two had
discontinued treatment pre-maturely, and five partici-
pants declined participation in the post-treatment phase.
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pants (7 men) about to start cognitive therapy for an
anxiety disorder other than PTSD. Twenty had a
primary diagnosis of panic disorder, five had a primary
diagnosis of generalized anxiety disorder, two had a
primary diagnosis of obsessive compulsive disorder,
and two had a primary diagnosis of social phobia. All
participants were screened to rule out a diagnosis of co-
morbid PTSD.
The non-patient control group consisted of 35
participants (15 men), not currently receiving treatment
for a psychiatric disorder. These participants were
recruited from the local community. Participants in the
non-patient group were screened for experiences of
trauma and PTSD using a trauma checklist, followed by
the Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale (PDS; Foa, Cash-
man, Jaycox, & Perry, 1997) and would have been
excluded from the study if they met full diagnostic
criteria for PTSD.
2.2. Design
This was a questionnaire study with a two-fold
design. The first step involved a between-subjects
comparison of the three groups (pre-treatment PTSD
patients vs. other anxiety disorder patients vs. non-
patients). The second step, a repeated measures design,
involved comparing the PTSD group’s estimates of
probability and cost before and after receiving
treatment, and examining the relationship between
changes in these estimates with symptomatic improve-
ment following treatment.
2.3. Measures
2.3.1. Demographic information
Collected on all participants including: age, level of
educational achievement, race, and gender.
2.3.2. Symptom measures
Patients and controls who reported a traumatic event
completed the Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale (PDS;
Foa et al., 1997), which asks patients to rate how much
they experienced each of the PTSD symptoms identified
in DSM-IV, ranging from 0 (‘‘never’’) to 3 (‘‘5 times per
week or more or almost always’’). The PDS yields a
sum score indicating the overall severity of PTSD
symptoms Foa et al. (1997) demonstrated that the PDS
has good reliability and concurrent validity with other
PTSD measures and with the structured clinical
interview for DSM-III-R (Foa et al., 1997). To check
the comparability of the three groups all participantswere asked to complete a standardized measure of
anxiety, the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck &
Steer, 1993) and of depression, the Beck Depression
Inventory (BDI; Beck, Steer, and Brown, 1996).
Patients with PTSD also completed the symptom
measures again after treatment.
2.3.3. Probability and Cost Questionnaire (PCQ)
This questionnaire (McManus & Ehlers, unpub-
lished measure—see Appendix A) was developed for
the purposes of this study. The PCQ consists of five
subscales of four items, each of which describes a
potential future negative event. Participants are asked to
rate how likely each event is to happen to them in the
near future on a scale from 0 ‘not at all likely to happen’
to 100 ‘almost sure to happen,’ and how bad or
distressing it would be if it did happen on a scale from 0
‘not at all bad/distressing’ to 100 ‘really bad/distres-
sing.’ The five subscales were as follows: accidental
traumas (e.g., ‘I will be involved in a road traffic
accident’), interpersonal violence traumas (e.g., ‘I will
be mugged’), negative life events (e.g., ‘a friend of mine
will die’), negative world events (e.g., ‘there will be a
famine that affects a third world country’) and daily
hassles (e.g., ‘I will get caught out in the rain’). The
internal consistency of each of the subscales was
relatively high with Cronbach’s alpha coefficients
ranging from 0.71 to 0.92 for both probability and
cost ratings on each of the five subscales.
In addition to the five sub-scales described above, a
further two subscales were derived for the PTSD group
according to the type of event that they had been
traumatized by. These two scales were ‘‘own type
trauma’’ (i.e., for those who were traumatized by an
accident this would be their score on the accidental
traumas subscale), and ‘‘other type trauma,’’ (i.e., for
those who were traumatized by an accident this would
be their score on the interpersonal violence trauma sub-
scale).
2.4. Data analysis
Each hypothesis was analysed in turn. Kolmogorov–
Smirnov Tests were used to examine whether the data
was normally distributed and Levene’s test for equity of
variance was used to look at the spread of the data.
Where the data violated the assumptions for the use of
parametric tests, transformations were attempted to
alter the distribution. Where no suitable transformation
could be found non-parametric equivalents were used.
The between group analyses were conducted using
either a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with
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with Mann–Whitney tests used for post hoc analyses.
Paired sample t-tests were used to conduct the within-
group analyses and the repeated measures design.
Pearson’s correlations and partial correlations were
used to examine the relationship between improvement
in treatment and changes in probability and cost
estimates.
3. Results
3.1. Demographic information
Participant demographics are shown in Table 1:
There were no significant differences between the
groups in terms of age, gender, ethnicity or marital
status. There was a significant difference between the
groups in terms of educational level. There was a greater
proportion of graduates in the non-patient and anxiousTable 1
Participant demographics
Demographic variable PTSD pre-treatment
group (N = 43)
Age
Mean age in years (S.D.) 36.9 (11.4)
Gender
No. of males (%) 15 (34.9)
No. of females (%) 28 (65.1)
Ethnic origin
No. (%)
Caucasian 32 (74.4)
Non-Caucasian 11 (25.6)
Level of education
No. of achieving (%)
GCSE/O’level 21 (50.0)
A’level/BTEC 11 (26.2)
Degree/HND 10 (23.8)
Marital status
No. (%)
Single/divorced/widow 20 (52.6)
Cohabiting/married 18 (47.4)
Missing 5
Table 2
Means and standard deviations (S.D.s) on the BDI, BAI, and PDS
Questionnaire PTSD pre-treatment group (N = 43) Anxiou
BDI 22.23 (9.76)a 19.86 (
BAI 25.56 (12.99)a 29.17 (
PDS 32.06 (8.08)a –
Note: Means with different superscripts differ significantly ( p < 0.05), only
therefore for this measure N = 16.control groups, compared to the PTSD pre-treatment
group. Thus where differences between the PTSD group
and the other groups were found Analyses of
Covariance (ANCOVA) were used to check that the
differences held up when education was controlled.
Within the PTSD group, the graduates did not differ
from the non-graduates on PDS scores (t = 1.3, p = ns)
and or on ratings of probability (t = 0.11, p = ns) or cost
(t = 0.3, p = ns).
Table 2 shows the group means and standard
deviations on the BDI, BAI, and PDS.
As expected, pre-treatment clinical groups scored
significantly higher than the non-patient group on all of
the clinical measures: BDI (H = 56.75, p < 0.001), BAI
(H = 70.59, p > 0.001) and PDS (H = 72.82,
p > 0.001). No significant differences were found
between the PTSD pre-treatment group and the anxious
control group on the BDI or the BAI, suggesting that the
two groups showed similar levels of clinical severity.Anxious control
group (N = 29)
Non-patient control
group (N = 35)
37.1 (11.7) 40.7 (13.5)
7 (24.1) 13 (37.1)
22 (73.9) 22 (62.9)
23 (79.3) 27 (77.1)
6 (20.7) 8 (22.9)
7 (24.1) 7 (20.0)
3 (10.3) 5 (14.3)
19 (65.5) 23 (65.7)
13 (44.8) 10 (28.6)
16 (55.2) 25 (7.4)
s control group (N = 29) Non-patient control group (N = 31)
10.67)a 4.80 (4.96)b
12.83)a 4.80 (4.30)b
3.23 (5.36)b
16 participants in the non-patient control group completed the PDS,
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Table 3
Means and standard deviations (S.D.s) on the Probability and Cost Questionnaire
Sub-scale PTSD pre-treatment (N = 43) Anxious control (probability, N = 29) (cost, N = 24) Non-patient control (N = 35)
Experiencing a traumatic event
Probability 33.08 (23.63)a 24.05 (19.73)ab 16.67 (12.35)b
Cost 78.82 (21.16)a 77.83 (18.52)ab 68.27 (15.40)b
Negative world events
Probability 39.55 (24.72)a 30.62 (23.78)a 39.43 (19.77)a
Cost 37.94 (24.99)a 37.86 (26.75)a 28.25 (20.16)a
Negative life events
Probability 37.94 (26.34)a 31.28 (26.14)a 24.69 (15.37)a
Cost 71.36 (22.51)a 67.19 (17.55)a 60.79 (14.22)a
Daily hassles
Probability 41.38 (23.31)a 39.61 (24.20)a 44.78 (19.95)a
Cost 22.33 (15.97)a 14.23 (14.75)b 14.76 (10.55)b
Note: Means with different superscripts differ significantly ( p < 0.05).3.2. Probability and cost of experiencing a
traumatic event
Group means and standard deviations for the
probability and cost of experiencing a traumatic event
or other negative event are shown in Table 3.
A significant difference in estimations of probability
(F(2,96) = 3.19, p = 0.046) and cost (F(2,93) = 4.65,
p = 0.013) was found between the groups. Post hoc tests
indicated that PTSD patients overestimated the prob-
ability and cost of experiencing traumatic events
relative to the non-patient controls, but not relative to
the anxious controls. This effect remained when the
effect of education was controlled (for probability
F(2,96) = 4.01, p = 0.021; for cost F(2,93) = 3.63,
p = 0.03) and the effect of education was not significant.
The anxious control group did not differ significantly in
their estimations from either the PTSD group or the
non-patient group.
3.3. Own type trauma versus other type trauma
The PTSD group’s mean scores for the probability
(mean = 37.15; S.D. = 27.11) and cost (mean = 83.63;
S.D. = 19.31) of experiencing another trauma of the
same type as their previous trauma (‘own type of
trauma’) were compared with their mean scores for the
probability (mean = 29.84; S.D. = 22.54) and cost
(70.29; 26.08) of experiencing a trauma of different
type (‘other type of trauma’). The PTSD group rated
both the probability (t = 2.60, p < 0.05) and cost
(t = 5.27, p < 0.05) of experiencing their own type of
trauma again higher than the probability and cost of
experiencing a different type of trauma.The PTSD group’s ratings of the probability
(mean = 37.15; S.D. = 27.11) and cost (mean = 83.63;
S.D. = 19.31) of experiencing their own type of
trauma was then compared with the anxious control
group’s ratings of the probability (mean = 24.05;
S.D. = 19.73) and cost (mean = 77.83; S.D. = 18.52)
of experiencing any type of trauma. Independent t-
tests showed that the PTSD group gave significantly
higher rating for their own type of trauma occurring
than the anxious control group gave for any type of
traumatic event occurring (t = 2.20, p < 0.05).
Although the difference in cost ratings was in the
expected direction, it was not significant (t = 1.170,
p = ns).
3.4. Probability and cost of experiencing a
negative, non-traumatic event
Group means and standard deviations for the
probability and cost of experiencing a negative, non-
traumatic event are given in Table 3. No significant
differences were found between the three groups on
their estimations of the probability of future negative
life events (U = 4.39, p = ns), negative world events
(F(2,104) = 1, p = ns), or daily hassles (F(2,104) =
0.45, p = ns) occurring.
No significant differences were found between the
three groups on their estimates of the cost of future
negative life events (F(2,99) = 3.04, p = ns) or
negative world events occurring (F(2,98) = 1.84,
p = ns). Even when education was controlled there
was a significant effect of group on the rating of the
cost of daily hassles (F(2,97) = 4.63, p = 0.012) and
the effect education was not significant. Post hoc tests
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Table 4
PTSD group pre and post-treatment scores on the Probability and Cost Questionnaire, the PDS, the BAI, and BDI
Measure N = 33 Pre-treatment (mean (S.D.)) Post-treatment (mean (S.D.)) t Observed
PDS 31.68 (8.20)a 10.96 (11.56)b 11.36
BAI 23.42 (12.11)a 10.15 (12.43)b 6.30
BDI 21.27 (9.59)a 12.21 (11.55)b 5.64
Probability and cost subscales
Accidental traumas Probability 34.05 (22.87)a 15.55 (18.97)b 6.52
Cost 80.76 (16.62)a 67.79 (23.45)b 3.35
Interpersonal violence traumas Probability 34.43 (27.88)a 16.89 (18.46)b 4.51
Cost 83.13 (22.22)a 69.75 (25.53)b 3.00
Negative life events Probability 39.43 (26.86)a 20.77 (25.63)b 4.95
Cost 74.29 (21.93)a 60.22 (22.40)b 3.78
Negative world events Probability 42.36 (25.67)a 29.40 (24.52)b 4.21
Cost 39.52 (25.25)a 33.38 (24.88)b 1.82
Daily hassles Probability 41.96 (23.55)a 35.86 (25.60)b 1.79
Cost 23.24 (15.90)a 14.87 (12.79)b 3.29
Note: Means with different superscripts differ significantly ( p < 0.05).revealed that PTSD patients rated the cost of daily
hassles significantly higher than either of the control
groups (U = 7.51, p < 0.05).
3.5. Effect of treatment on symptoms and
estimations of probability and cost
The means and standard deviations of the PTSD
group’s questionnaire scores pre and post-treatment are
given in Table 4.
PTSD patients scored significantly lower on the
PDS, BDI, and BAI following treatment. Dependent
t-tests showed that the PTSD group scored
significantly lower on all five sub-scales of the
Probability and Cost Questionnaire at post-treatment
than pre-treatment. To see if the PTSD group’s
estimations of the probability and cost of traumatic
events occurring had returned to non-clinical levels
their post-treatment scores on the trauma subscales
of the Probability and Cost Questionnaire were
compared with those of the non-patient control
group. Independent sample t-tests showed that there
were no significant differences between the post-
treatment PTSD group’s scores and the non-patients’
scores for the probability of experiencing an
accidental trauma (t = 0.26, p = ns) or an inter-
personal violence trauma (t = 0.48, p = ns) or for
the cost of experiencing an accidental trauma
(t = 0.76, p = ns) or an inter-personal violence
trauma (t = 0.45, p = ns).3.6. The relationship between changes in
estimations of probability and cost and treatment
outcome
The PDS was repeated after treatment to assess the
impact of treatment on patients’ PTSD symptoms.
PTSD patients’ scores on the PDS were significantly
reduced by treatment (t = 8.86, p < 0.001). A Pearson’s
correlation was used to see how changes in estimations
of the probability and cost of being involved in future
traumatic events were related to change in PDS scores
post-treatment. There were significant correlations
between change in PDS scores and change in both
probability and cost estimations (r = 0.398, p = 0.024
and r = 0.439, p = 0.011 respectively). The correlation
between change in probability estimates and change in
PDS scores did not remain significant when change in
cost estimates was controlled for (r = 0.146, p > 0.05).
The correlation between change in cost estimates and
change in PDS remained significant when changes in
probability estimates were controlled for (r = 0.401,
p = 0.038).
4. Discussion
Results of the current study show that, prior to
receiving treatment, patients with PTSD overestimate
the probability and cost of being involved in future
traumatic events relative to non-patient controls. They
particularly overestimate the probability and cost of
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triggered their PTSD. This overestimation of the
probability and cost of ‘own’ traumas occurs in
comparison to non-anxious controls, in comparison to
the anxious control group, and also in comparison to
their own estimations of the probability and cost of
‘other’ traumatic events. This evidence of overestima-
tion of the probability and cost of future traumatic
events is in line with cognitive models of PTSD (e.g.,
Ehlers & Clark, 2000). The finding that PTSD patients
overestimate both the likelihood and cost of future
traumatic events occurring suggests that they are
interpreting the fact that the trauma occurred as
indicative of a current or future threat. It also seems
that there is some specificity to the source of this threat,
as PTSD patients did not show overestimations of the
probability and cost of all types of negative event.
Previous research has suggested that patients with
different anxiety disorders show unique, disorder
specific patterns of judgment bias (McManus et al.,
2000), which are not attributable to general anxiety. In
this study, the PTSD group indeed showed such a
specific bias in that they overestimated the probability
and cost of further traumas of the type that they had
experienced. However, contrary to predictions, the
PTSD group did not overestimate the probability and
cost of all traumatic events relative to patients with
other anxiety disorders, although means for probability
ratings were in the expected direction. Low power may
have been in part responsible for the lack of significance
for traumatic events in general. Another contributing
factor may be that 20 of the 29 participants in the
anxious control group had a primary diagnosis of panic
disorder; and it has recently been suggested that patients
with panic disorder showed more generalized biases in
overestimation of negative events that other anxiety
disorder patients (Uren, Szabo, & Lovibond, 2004).
Nevertheless, patients with PTSD estimated the cost
and probability of the type of traumatic event that
matched their own trauma compared to an equally
anxious and depressed control group, ruling out the
possibility that this judgment bias merely reflects
elevated anxiety or depression.
In contrast to Smith and Bryant’s (2000) finding of
generalized biases in ASD patients, the PTSD patients
in this study only showed a specific bias for the types of
traumatic event that they had experienced. They did not
overestimate probability or cost of all negative non-
traumatic events. These findings are in keeping with
studies of social phobia (Foa et al., 1996) and eating
disorders (Cooper, 1997), where very specific judgment
biases have been reported. A possible explanation of thefinding of highly generalized biases in ASD but very
specific biases PTSD is that ASD is a reaction that
occurs in the first four weeks following the trauma. At
this time the person is still in a heightened state of
distress and processes of adjustment are in their early
stages. In this initial phase the cognitive biases shown
may be generalized and wide reaching; however, as time
progresses and some adjustment takes place, the
cognitive biases become more specific and fixed on
stimuli specific to the trauma. This is a preliminary
hypothesis that requires further investigation with
longitudinal studies.
It is important to note that prior to treatment, the
PTSD pre-treatment group overestimated the cost of
daily hassles relative to both the anxious control group
and the non-patient group. Overestimation of the cost of
daily hassles may reflect difficulties that people
experiencing chronic PTSD are likely to be having
functioning in their day-to-day life, in that they may find
daily hassles more difficult to cope with than others
because of other consequences of the trauma/PTSD
impacting on their life (e.g., financial problems,
physical disabilities or pain).
Prior to treatment, PTSD patients overestimated the
probability and cost of all types of traumatic events
occurring relative to non-patients. After treatment
PTSD patients showed reduced estimations of prob-
ability and cost on all of the sub-scales, and their
estimations were no longer significantly different from
the non-patient group on any subscale of the Probability
and Cost Questionnaire. This is a positive result, which
adds to the existing evidence suggesting that cognitive
therapy for PTSD is effective at addressing the
cognitive biases that underlie PTSD (Ehlers et al.,
2005). Change in both probability and cost estimations
were found to be a significantly correlated with changes
in PTSD symptoms (as measured by the PDS),
suggesting a link between reductions in cognitive
biases and a reduction in symptoms. However, only the
correlation with changes in cost estimations remained
significant when controlling for probability estimates.
This suggests that it may be more important for
clinicians to focus on modifying PTSD patients’
appraisals of the cost of future traumatic events in
order to achieve good outcomes from CBT treatment.
Current results need to be interpreted in the light of
some of the limitations of the study. One limitation of
the study is that this is the first time that the Probability
and Cost Questionnaire has been used and hence, there
is only limited information available about its validity
and reliability. However, results suggest that the
questionnaire shows good internal consistency and
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groups from non-clinical groups. The questionnaire also
appeared to have reasonable construct validity, as
evidenced by participants rating daily hassles as more
likely to happen than inter-personal violence traumas
and negative life events as more personally costly than
negative world events. Larger samples, particularly in
the post-treatment phase, would also have strengthened
the study by giving more power for some of the
analyses. Another limitation of the study is that the
groups were not matched for educational level (a
smaller proportion of the PTSD patients were educated
to graduate level than in the other two groups). This
finding matches the literature showing that lower
intelligence/education predicts PTSD (McNally &
Shin, 1995). And it is worth noting that there wereno differenced in ratings of probability and cost
between the more and less educated PTSD patients,
and any difference between the PTSD patients and the
control groups remained when level of education was
controlled for statistically.
Findings of the current study support both the
cognitive model of PTSD and the role of cognitive
therapy in the treatmentof PTSD.Thefindingof a specific
overestimation of the probability and cost of the type of
trauma that the patient was traumatized is consistent with
the central premise of Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) cognitive
model of PTSD, i.e., that the trauma is interpreted as a
current or future threat. Current results also support the
validity of cognitive therapy for PTSD as an effective way
of modifying PTSD patients’ overestimations of the
probability and cost of future traumatic events.
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